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3‘Paying Attention’ in a DigitalEconomy: Reflections on the Role
of Analysis and Judgement Within
Contemporary Discourses
of Mindfulness and Comparisons




By the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century,
building upon the development of reformist-
oriented Buddhist modernisms in the previous
century (McMahan 2008), Asian philosophies
and meditative practices have increasingly been
adopted as means of reducing stress and adjust-
ing to life in a fast-paced world of a globalizing
and capitalist economy. This can be seen in the
extraordinary popularity and spread of Jon
Kabat-Zinn’s Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduc-
tion (MBSR) techniques, itself drawing directly
upon the revivalist vipassana-only movement of
Burma’s Mahasi Sayadaw (1904–1982), within
Western health-care systems, corporate ‘stress-
relief’ management classes and even within the
USA and Korean military. That there are con-
siderable disparities between the techniques and
aims of these practices (and their emphasis upon
immediate stress-relief) and traditional Buddhist
meditational teachings and practices, which seek
to intensify one’s awareness of duḥkha, is a
subject requiring rigorous and critical attention
by scholars of Buddhism.
What is new about modern discourses of
mindfulness and how might they relate or not to
the ancient Buddhist discourses about mental
training/development (bhāvanā) to which they
often appeal? How does an ancient set of practices
designed to cultivate a spiritual awareness of
radical impermanence (anitya) and existential
strife (duḥkha) become a globally accepted secu-
lar technique for stress reduction and well-being?
What issues are involved when a set of ancient
meditative practices, designed to achieve a state of
liberation (nirvāṇa) from rebirth and embedded in
Buddhist monastic rituals, institutional practices
and an ethic of non-violence, are transformed into
a modern, secularized therapeutic intervention
widely adopted in Western health-care systems,
corporate boardrooms and military training
regimes?
Mindfulness and Attention
A history of mindfulness is simultaneously a
history of attention. According to the late
nineteenth-century French psychologist Théod-
ule Ribot, attention can be characterized as
‘progress towards unity of consciousness’. In this
regard, Ribot argues attention ‘is an exceptional,
abnormal state, which cannot last a long time, forR. King (&)
University of Kent, Kent, UK
e-mail: R.E.King@kent.ac.uk
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the reason that it is in contradiction to the basic
condition of psychic life; namely, change’.1
Using Ribot’s designation we can go some-
way to understand what classical Buddhist liter-
ature means by sati (Sanskrit: smṛti), the Pali
word now almost universally translated into
English as ‘mindfulness’. Attention involves the
adverting of consciousness towards an object of
experience but to ‘hold one’s attention’ upon that
object also requires a certain ‘unity of con-
sciousness’. In classical Buddhist accounts of
mental training (bhāvanā), overcoming the
oscillating nature of consciousness and achieving
mental equipoise are associated with techniques
designed to facilitate concentration (samādhi)
and calm (samatha). The standard account that
emerged within the Buddhist literature tended to
emphasize the conjoining of techniques designed
to facilitate awareness and attention (vipassanā)
and those which facilitated an ever greater unity
of consciousness (samādhi), although it is likely
that the precise balance between these two varied
in different circumstances, traditions and indi-
vidual practices (Cousins 1973).
Although classical Buddhist literature might
agree with some of Ribot’s characterization of
attention, it would not necessarily agree with his
description of it as an ‘abnormal’ state of mind.
Arguably, the Buddhist—and generally yogic—
diagnosis of our mental condition is that the
so-called everyday, distracted (vikṣepa) states of
mind are themselves the aberration or problem to
be overcome. However, most of our everyday
experience is indeed a history of repeated dis-
traction (what the Buddhists describe as our
‘monkey mind’). Similarly, Ribot’s account
implies that attention is a fleeting matter under-
mined by the fluctuating nature of experience.
For Buddhists, focused attention leads to a much
greater awareness of the fact of change, but in
advanced practitioners, this is not seen as pre-
venting the cultivation of attention as a stabiliz-
ing mode of continued awareness. Indeed,
prolonged attention is seen, in many Buddhist
accounts as a much greater awareness of
that flux.
Nevertheless, it is clear that as the Buddhist
tradition developed two different characteriza-
tions of consciousness emerged: one focused on
the reality of impermanence, and the Buddhist
emphasis on no-abiding-self (anātman) empha-
sized the processual nature of consciousness. The
path of mental training involves disciplining the
mind to avoid distraction and to remain present to
one’s experience of the radical impermanence of
reality. However, another strand of thought is also
present in the early Buddhist literature which
resonated more strongly with the prevailing ‘yo-
gic’ philosophical opinion in India. This second
strand postulated an innate unity and purity of
consciousness and saw the achievement of mental
equipoise and calmness as a return of con-
sciousness to its natural state—like a pond once
the ripples of a pebble have dispersed or the ocean
below the waves. On this view, our prevailing
everyday experience of dispersed and distracted
states of mind constituted the stirring up or
‘whirring’ of consciousness (citta-vṛtti) from its
natural state and was indicative of life in the
saṃsāric realm for those not yet awakened and
liberated from the cycle of rebirths. This notion of
an underlying unity of consciousness behind our
changing states of mind was the model that pre-
dominated in the Brahmanical yogic traditions
associated with Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the Upani-
ṣads (Vedānta) where it was associated with a
non-agential and pure ‘witness consciousness’
(sākṣin) standing ‘behind’ the changing flow of
experiences. Although the dominant conception
of consciousness in Buddhist philosophical
thought in India however remained the processual
model, as outlined in the Abhidharma literature,
the ‘innate purity’ model continued to ﬁnd vehi-
cles for expression, most overtly in the ‘Buddha
nature’ (tathāgatagarbha) strand of the
Mahāyana (emerging in the fourth/ﬁfth century
CE) and in subsequent debates about the sudden
or gradual nature of enlightenment.2
1Ribot (1898: 2).




‘Meditation’ and the Role
of Intellectual Analysis
The Buddhist tradition has long had a speciﬁc
association with what we have come to call in the
West ‘meditation’. Use of this English word
carries an ambiguity within it since it is often
used to denote a set of speciﬁc practices linked to
pacifying the analytic processes of the mind and
achieving a state of concentrated calmness,
practices that, in the Buddhist tradition, are
associated with the jhānas (Sanskrit; dhyāna)
and the cultivation of concentration and calm
(samādhi/samatha). However, the English word
meditate is also used as a synonym of the exer-
cise of sustained mental reflection upon some-
thing as in ‘I shall meditate on that question and
get back to you’. In a Buddhist context, the
exercise of reflective cognition is associated with
the cultivation of insight (Pali: vipassanā; San-
skrit: vipaśyanā) and wisdom or ‘analytical
insight’ (paññā/prajñā). The potential elision
between this second aspect of ‘mental training’
(bhāvanā, what we now routinely translate into
English as ‘meditation’) and the general appli-
cation of analytic reasoning/mental reflection
produced a similar ambiguity within Buddhist
circles, akin to the two senses of ‘meditation’ in
an Anglophone context. Although, as we shall
see, the mainstream Abhidharmic account of
Buddhist mental training presupposes a signiﬁ-
cant role for mental ratiocination and cognition,
alternative views which characterize awakening
(bodhi) as the quiescence of all mental activity
continue to be expressed, especially in those
strands of Buddhist thought which came to adopt
a non-dualistic worldview (such as some forms
of Ch’an/Zen (Sharf 2014a, b) and Tibetan
dzogchen practice).3
The thorny question of the relationship of an
intellectual analysis of the nature of reality and
the systematic practice of disciplining and calm-
ing the mind is encapsulated by the combination
of sammā-sati and sammā-samādhi as twin
components of standard Buddhist accounts of the
nature of mental development and training. As La
Vallée Poussin ﬁrst noted, a concrete instance of
the tension between ‘understanding the Dhamma’
and disciplining the mind can be found in the
example of two of the Buddha’s disciples Musīla
and Nārada (La Vallée Poussin 1937). Musīla is
said to have acquired a detailed understanding of
the teachings of the Buddha based upon mental
comprehension and analysis but has not ‘touched
nirvāṇa with the body’, that is not achieved a
direct experiential realization of it.
Friend, though I have clearly seen as it really is
with correct wisdom ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of
existence,’ I am not an arahant, one whose taints
are destroyed. Suppose, friend, there was a well
along a desert road, but it has neither a rope nor a
bucket. Then a man would come along, oppressed
and afflicted by the heat, tired parched, and thirsty.
He would look down into the well and the
knowledge would occur to him, ‘There is water,’
but he would not be able to make bodily contact
with it (na ca kāyena phusitvā vihareyya). So too,
friend, though I have clearly seen as it really is
with correct wisdom, ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of
existence,’ I am not an arahant, one whose taints
are destroyed.4
Similarly, Anguttara Nikāya VI, 46 records
discord within the community of the Buddha’s
disciples in the form of a distinction between the
jhāyin (one who practices the jhānas) and the
dhammayogins who are said to have an intel-
lectual grasp of the teachings based upon the
application of analytical insight (prajñā).
Friends, there are monks who are keen on
Dhamma (dhammayogin) and they disparage those
monks who are meditators (jhāyin), saying: ‘Look
at those monks! They think, “We are meditating,
we are meditating!” And so they meditate to and
meditate fro, meditate up and meditate down.
What, then, do they meditate about and why do
they meditate?” Thereby neither these monks keen
on Dhamma nor the meditators will be pleased,
and they will not be practising for the welfare and
happiness of the multitude, for the good of the
multitude, for the welfare and happiness of devas
and humans.5
3See Sharf (2014a, b) and Dunne (2013) for further
discussion of this.
4Kosambī Sutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya II.68, translation in
Bodhi (2000: 611).
5Anguttara Nikāya VI, 46, translation in Bodhi and Thera
(1999: 163–164).
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It is not immediately clear from this account if
we are to take the jhāyin to denote a practitioner
of techniques leading to the quiescence of
‘mental whirring’ (citta-vṛtti)6 associated with
samādhi training or if this also includes the
systematic cultivation of insight (vipassanā) and
‘mindfulness’ (sati). Thus, we cannot be abso-
lutely certain whether the term dhammayogin
denotes a ‘purely intellectual’ and scholarly
appreciation of the Dhamma or it relates to a
conception of meditative practice that empha-
sizes the continued application (and even en-
hancement) of mental cognition, analytic
reasoning through the cultivation of insight
(vipassanā).
The discord recorded between these two
groups perhaps reflects early ambiguities and
tensions about the role of and relationship between
‘insight-based’ and ‘concentration-based’ tech-
niques in the Pali Buddhist literature but may also
reflect a difference of opinion over the role and
importance of mental ratiocination in the
achievement of liberation. As the traditional story
of the Buddha’s life coalesced, probably over
many centuries, the standard resolution of this
tension was to assign the practice of advanced
stages of concentration, such as the achievement
of the sphere of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana)
and the sphere of neither perception nor non-
perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana), to the
training undertaken by Gotama under the guid-
ance of Aḷara Kalama and Uddaka Rāmaputta
prior to his full awakening (seeWynne 2007). The
problem with following these methods alone, it
came to be argued, is that while they pacify the
thirst-drivenmotivational impulses to a signiﬁcant
extent and also train the aspirant in achieving a
one-pointed (ekāgatta) state of mind, without the
cultivation of insight and the development of a full
existential appreciation of the four noble truths
(and three marks of existence), they do not lead to
ﬁnal awakening (bodhi).
A similar tension, I wish to argue, plays out in a
new form and context in contemporary discourses
about ‘mindfulness’ in the late twentieth and early
twenty-ﬁrst centuries. As ‘mindfulness-based’
practices become adapted and applied in
non-Buddhist and ‘secular’ contexts, the domi-
nant discourse has tended to characterize ‘mind-
fulness’ as a present-centred and non-judgemental
awareness, seeking to curtail to a signiﬁcant
degree our usual processes of mental ratiocination
and cultivating an attitude of calm acceptance and
‘bare attention’ free from analysis and judgement.
Thus, as Jon Kabat-Zinn describes it, mindfulness
is about ‘paying attention in a particular way: on
purpose, in the present moment, and
non-judgementally’.7 However, while this is per-
haps the dominant characterization of mindful-
ness, it is by no means the only model of
mindfulness in operation.
Many contemporary Buddhist accounts of
mindfulness, drawing upon the Abhidharmic
model, assert quite forcefully the role of cognition
and ethical judgement in the context of mindful-
ness practice. This is most strikingly clear in
accounts offered by proponents of what has come
to be known as Engaged Buddhism. As we shall
see, the traditional Abhidharmic emphasis upon
analysing the causal conditions which produce
suffering (duḥkha) and the clear role of ethical
reflections and judgements upon one’s experience
in seeking to cultivate harmonious states of mind
(kuśala) are emphasized and in fact quite radically
extended in some engaged Buddhist accounts
transforming mindfulness into a form of direct
political ‘consciousness-raising’ in relation to the
embedded structures of social and economic
injustice that inform our everyday experience of
the world. The distinction between these two
characterizations of mindfulness, I shall argue,
constitutes a still-emerging theoretical fault line
6I use this phrase because it resonates more generally with
the trend in yogic philosophical circles to focus on
techniques for pacifying mental vacillation in advanced
states of concentration (samādhi). Note for instance how
in the Ur-text of the Hindu Brahmanical yoga school,
Patañjali deﬁnes yoga precisely as the ‘cessation of
mental whirring’ (cittavṛttinirodhāḥ, YS1.2).
7Kabat-Zinn (1994), 4 For some insightful discussion of
the modern emphasis on ‘being in the moment




within contemporary discourses of mindfulness
and is thrown into relief by the rapidly changing
context of early twenty-ﬁrst-century life.
I will briefly discuss three factors of contem-
porary life that have precipitated this fault line in
the late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries.
They are as follows: the global spread of
neoliberal forms of capitalism, growing concerns
about climate change and social and economic
disparities of wealth, and the impact of new
digital technologies on human consciousness.
First, however, it is important to be clear about
some of the philosophical assumptions underly-
ing traditional Buddhist accounts of sati.
Mind and Mindfulness in Ancient
Indian Buddhist Thought
We take the rendering ‘mindfulness’ so much for
granted that we rarely inquire into the precise
nuances of the English term, let alone the meaning
of the original Pali word it represents and the
adequacy of the former as a rendering for the latter.
(Bodhi 2013: 22)
It is important to take a moment to look afresh
at ancient Buddhist debates about techniques of
mental development/training (bhāvanā) and resist
their easy assimilation into a set of modern,
Western assumptions and representations of what
we now call ‘Buddhist meditation’. This is espe-
cially important since Buddhist traditions have
come to be associated in theWest with a particular
understanding of ‘meditation’, often conceived in
terms of the ‘paciﬁcation of the mind’ because of
the way that ‘Buddhism’ came to be associated
with prevailing Orientalist stereotypes about ‘the
mystic East’. If “mysticism” is seen as the
pre-eminently non-rational, then Buddhism, when
viewed as a mystical tradition, comes to be framed
in terms that reflect such cultural assumptions. As
already noted, however, even in English the word
‘meditation’ carries an ambiguity—denoting
either a paciﬁcation of the mind or a process of
mental reflection. The association of ‘Buddhism’
with the former in the popular imagination has
occluded the important role assigned to mental
reflection and analysis in many traditional Bud-
dhist accounts of the cultivation of sati.
Another way to illustrate this point is to con-
sider the English phrase ‘being philosophical’.
There are two primary ways in which this phrase
is used. Firstly, and probably more commonly, it
denotes a form of relaxed detachment in the face
of adversity, e.g. ‘Her beloved piano fell down
the stairs but she was philosophical about it’.
There is a second use of the term however
denoting a form of critical, intellectual reflection
upon language and/or experience associated more
speciﬁcally with the disciplined activity of
philosophical analysis. Consider for instance the
example of the sixth century BCE pre-Socratic
philosopher Anaxamines. It is said that he once
thought to blow on his hand in two ways: ﬁrst
with his mouth open and then with his lips pursed.
When blowing with an open mouth, he experi-
enced warmth, but with his lips pursed, his breath
felt cold to his hand. Anaxamines then asked why
this was so and in doing so sought to analyse his
experience to understand the underlying cause of
the change in sensations. Such examples as this
have often been used to locate the origins of
philosophy and even science as a whole in the
thought experimentations of the pre-Socratics of
ancient Greece.8 However, it strikes me that on
some classical Buddhist readings of sati, there is a
similar emphasis upon a stepping back and
observation of experience combined with an
analytical reflection upon its antecedent causes.
From this perspective, sati is much more about
cultivating a ‘philosophical approach’ to the
world—in both senses of the modern use of that
term—on the one hand as a form of suspended
emotional detachment (‘being philosophical’) but
also in the sense of offering a meta-analytic per-
spective upon experience—a mental cogitation
on what is presented in perceptions, the exercise,
if you like, of critical thinking or a philosophical
analysis of experience.
Modern accounts of mindfulness of the
Kabat-Zinn variety tend to ignore this second
dimension of sati. Mindfulness becomes pri-
marily about witnessing without reacting, ‘being
philosophical’ in the ﬁrst sense but certainly not
in the second. As we will see, in classical
8See for instance, Vernon (2015).
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Abhidharma and early Mahāyāna accounts, sati
is usually represented as exemplifying both
dimensions—fostering a degree of emotional
detachment—a ‘standing back’ from reactive
habitual forms (emphasized in Nyanaponika’s
focus upon sati as a form of ‘bare attention’) but
also by the disciplined exercise of analytical
insight (prajñā) to that experience through an
examination of its antecedent causes and condi-
tions and an intention to direct consciousness
towards ethically wholesome rather than
unwholesome thoughts.
We must appreciate therefore that the political
and cultural transformation involved in the
translation of key terms and practices from their
ancient Buddhist context and into a modern
English conceptual frame, replete with its own
cultural associations. As Talal Asad has noted:
To put it crudely, because the languages of third
world societies… are seen as weaker in relation to
Western languages (and today, especially to Eng-
lish), they are more likely to submit to forcible
transformation in the translation process than the
other way around.9
In this sense, one needs to revisit the standard
translation of these terms in order to resist their
easy assimilation to modern Anglophone
assumptions about ‘mindfulness’, allowing them
to retain a ‘discomforting—even scandalous—
presence within the received language’ (Asad
1993: 199). To do this, we need to appreciate that
there is an enormous complexity to ancient
Buddhist philosophical discussions of con-
sciousness and a rich vocabulary of technical
terms encompassing what in an English language
context would be called ‘mind’ or ‘conscious-
ness’. In the Indian traditions of Buddhist
thought include Sanskrit terms such as citta,
manas and vijñāna and cognate terms (such as
jñāna, prajñā, saṃjñā and dhyāna) referring to
different functions and modalities of awareness,
representing affective, cognitive and conative
dimensions of consciousness. Understanding
these terms is crucial for an appreciation of the
emergence and eventual consolidation of early
Buddhist accounts of the mental training (bhā-
vanā) required to achieve awakening (bodhi).
In the West, the material and the mental
worlds have often been treated as two distinctive
domains; however, in the ancient Indian context
in which Buddhist notions of mental training ﬁrst
developed it is important to recognize the inad-
equacy of such dualisms. Although Buddhists
texts frequently refer to ‘nāma-rūpa’ (name and
form, often glossed in English as ‘mind’ and
‘body’), these are usually taken in unison as a
compound form, reflecting a recognition of the
‘psychosomatic’ nature of human experience. It
is also stated many times throughout the early
Buddhist literature that mind or consciousness
cannot arise without a material base and similarly
that our experience of material objects is
dependent upon the arising of a consciousness of
them. Moreover, Indian Buddhist thought
developed a complex array of terms to denote the
different affective, cognitive and conative oper-
ations of consciousness.
Sensory awareness (vijñāna) arises as a result of
contact between the sense organs and their speciﬁc
sense objects. There are six sensory realms in
classical Buddhist thought, what have traditionally
been known as the ﬁve senses (sight, sound,
touch, smell and taste), plus mano-vijñāna—
mental consciousness, which apprehends internal
states of mind, ideas, etc. The mental function of
apperception (mano-vijñāna) came to be distin-
guished over time from manas—the mind as a
centralizing and agential faculty that organizes the
different arrays of sense data, thereby constructing
a coherent mental picture out of these disparate
sensory sources. Thus, it is quite common in an
Indian Buddhist context to see mano-vijñāna
described as a ‘sixth sense’—an apprehender of
‘mental’ sensory data and for this to be clearly
distinguished from themore analytical functions of
consciousness (carried out by the manas). Thus,
apart from a basic conscious awareness (vijñāna)
of a sensation (vedanā), Buddhist thought also
acknowledges the role of mental cognition in the
classiﬁcation of sensory impressions (saṃjñā), as
well as the affective response that arises in relation
to those impressions (the various saṃskāras).
These factors then induce the arousal of intention9Asad (1993:190).
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(cetanā, the conative aspect) in the individual,
reflecting a goal-directed response to one’s
environment.
The Pali word for ‘mindfulness’, Sati, and its
Sanskrit equivalent, smṛti, have a primary mean-
ing of memory or recollection. In a Hindu Brah-
manical context, smṛti denotes the ‘remembered
traditions’ (such as the Mahābhārata and the
Rāmāyana), to be distinguished from śruti—‘that
which is heard,’ namely the direct revelation of
the Vedas. In the context of training of the mind
(bhāvanā), the early Buddhist usage retains some
of this sense, but, rather than focusing upon
‘historical memory’, relates more to the idea of a
mental state of sustained attention—an awareness
that remains present to the complex, evanescent
and causally produced operations of conscious-
ness and its objects, or to use John Peacock’s
preferred translation: ‘present moment recollec-
tion’ (Peacock 2014: 6).10 Buddhaghosa (1950)
characterizes sati as a form of ‘remembering’
(saraṇa) and says it is characterized by ‘not
wobbling’ (apilāpana): ‘Its function is not to
forget. It is manifested as guarding, or it is man-
ifested as the state of confronting an objective
ﬁeld’ (Visuddhimagga XIV, 141).11 As Gethin
(2013: 264) notes, early English renditions of the
term in its speciﬁcally Buddhist context include
‘correct meditation’ (for sammā-sati, Gogerley
1845); ‘the faculty that reasons on moral subjects,
the conscience’ (Hardy 1850); and the ‘ascer-
tainment of truth by mental application’ (Hardy
1853). It seems, however, that the ﬁrst person to
translate sati (Sanskrit: smṛti) as mindfulness was
T. W. Rhys-Davids in 1910. He remarks:
Etymologically, Sati is memory. But as happened at
the rise of Buddhism to somany other expressions in
common use, a new connotation was then attached
to the word, a connotation that have a new meaning
to it, and renders ‘memory’ a most inadequate and
misleading translation. It became the memory,
recollection, calling-to-mind, being aware of, cer-
tain speciﬁed facts. Of these the most important was
the impermanence (the coming to be as the result of a
cause, and the passing away again) of all phenom-
ena, bodily and mental. And it included the repeated
application of this awareness, to each experience of
life, from the ethical point of view.12
It is clear that in classical Buddhist literature,
sati involves an analytic awareness of the truth of
the four noble truths leading to a deep appreciation
of the impermanent, suffering and no-self marks
of existence. This involves a clear comprehension
(sampajañña) of causal relations (how things arise
and cease), and part of the point in using a term
like sati is to emphasize how this requires a
‘memory of the present’, a sustained attention to
the present moment, including its causal history—
that is, a recollection of past behavioural patterns
and experiences that inform the present moment.
In the Nikāya and Abhidharma discussions of sati
then, such practice requires rather than suspends
analytical reflection upon experience.13 More-
over, the practice of sati is taken to be a practice
integratedwithin the wider aspects of the eightfold
path and includes ethical reflection upon the
wholesome and unwholesome dhammas that arise
within the mind and an explicit aim of cultivating
the former and uprooting the latter. It seems quite
clear then that from the Abhidharmic point of
view, sati involves sustained ethical reflection and
analysis of the processes of causation that lead to
the rise of dhammas. Thus, drawing upon tradi-
tional Abhidharmic accounts of sati, Dreyfus
(2013: 47) argues that
Mindfulness then is not the present-centred
non-judgemental awareness of an object but the
paying close attention to an object, leading to the
retention of the data so as to make sense of the
information delivered by our cognitive apparatus.
Thus, far from being limited to the present and to a
mere refraining from passing judgement, mind-
fulness is a cognitive activity closely connected to
memory, particularly to working memory, the
ability to keep relevant information active so that it
can be integrated within meaningful patterns and
used for goal-directed activities.14
10Peacock (2014). Referring in particular to Dham-
masaṅghaṇi 16, Gethin (2013: 270) notes the following
early Abhidhamma terms associated with sati: recollec-
tion (annusati), recall (paṭissati) remembrance (saraṇatā),
keeping in mind (dhāraṇatā), absence of floating
(apilāpanatā) and an absence of forgetfulness
(asammussanatā).
11Translation in Ñāṇamoli (1975: 467).
12Rhys-Davids and Rhys-Davids (1910: 322).
13For a useful discussion of the role of mental cognition in
Pali canonical Buddhist accounts of sati see Bodhi (2013)
14Dreyfus (2013)
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The Centrality of Prajñā
in Abhidharma and Early
Mahāyāna Accounts
As a number of scholars have suggested (see for
instance Gethin 2011; Cousins 1996), the singling
out of ‘insight meditation’ as the distinctive ele-
ment within Buddhist meditational practice does
not seem to reflect a traditional Theravāda per-
spective which generally involves a conjunction
of insight and concentration practices as symbi-
otic constituents of the eightfold path. Indeed, it is
questionable whether one can speak accurately of
‘insight meditation’ in this way before the modern
period. As Bhikkhu Anālayo notes:
[I]n the thought-world of the early discourses the
term vipassanā stands predominantly for insight as
a quality to be developed. This thus differs from
the modern day usage, where vipassanā often
stands representative for a particular form of
meditation, usually a speciﬁc technique whose
practice marks off one insight meditation tradition
from another.15
Nevertheless, in the stress placed upon the
cultivation of mindfulness (sati) and wisdom
(paññā) as a necessary component of the path to
awakening, we see an important ideological
marker of the distinctive contribution of the
Buddha as a teacher when compared to the other
yogically oriented movements of the India of his
day. Indeed, in characteristically Indic fashion,
concentration-inducing practices—and the pre-
vailing hierarchical cosmologies associated with
them—were incorporated into the Buddhist
eightfold path (as sammā samādhi, ‘right con-
centration’) but characterized as singularly deﬁ-
cient unless symbiotically linked to the practice
of sammā sati (‘right mindfulness’) and the cul-
tivation of insight (vipassanā).
Within Indian Buddhist literature, therefore,
the cultivation of wisdom or ‘analytical insight’
(paññā/prajñā) came to be seen as a crucial
marker of a distinctively Buddhist path of mental
development (bhāvanā) when compared to pre-
vailing yogic systems in India. The cultivation or
exercise of prajñā thus came to be used in
Buddhist circles as an indicator of the superiority
of Buddhist mental training (bhāvanā) when
compared to other systems of yogic discipline
which also utilized the language of concentration
(samādhi) and the goal of the uniﬁcation of
consciousness through meditative equipoise. The
claim that prajñā and the cultivation of insight
were speciﬁc features of the Buddhist approach to
mental training is of course not one that was
accepted by these rival schools. Patañjali’s Yoga-
Sūtra for instance sees the goal of yogic practice
as the ‘cessation of mental fluctuations’ (cit-
tavṛttinirodhāh, YS 1.2) but makes it abundantly
clear that advanced forms of samādhi rather than
being mere states of internalized concentration
remain truth-bearing states that involve prajñā
(YS I.48).16 In contrast, many Buddhist accounts
speak of samādhi as a state of inward concen-
tration leading to calm, but not necessarily to
insight. One of the thorny issues here is recog-
nizing how different yogic literary traditions
deploy the same technical terms (such as samādhi
and prajñā) but with quite different implications.
It is worth dwelling briefly then upon the role
and place of prajñā in the practice of ‘mindful-
ness’ (smṛti/sati). One of the challenges here is
that because prajñā came to be seen as an
indispensable component of an awakened mind,
the term took on a level of signiﬁcance within the
Buddhist tradition which meant that while it
could never be repudiated as central to the cul-
tivation of mindfulness and the achievement of
the Buddhist goal of awakening, its precise
meaning often varied according to the context.
This led Padmanabh Jaini to remark:
It must be admitted … the precise meaning of
prajñā itself remains obscure. One sometimes feels
that nothing deﬁnite can be said beyond the
statement that prajñā is something which was
attained by the Buddha and is attainable by
bodhisattvas.17
15Anālayo (2012: 214)
16What Patañjali means by ‘prajñā’ here is of course up
for discussion. Is it to be viewed as a general term for
wisdom/insight or does it denote something like the
Abhidharma technical usage of the term as analytical





Nevertheless, it is clear that the general
understanding of the term within the Nikāya lit-
erature is that it is through prajñā that one sees
things as they are (yathābhūta). Although the term
is often translated generically as ‘wisdom’ in
English (a vague rendition that works well in
obscuring underlying philosophical technicalities
and tensions sometimes operating across tradi-
tions), within the Abhidharma literature it is clear
that prajñā is used in a more technically precise
sense to denote the faculty of ‘analytical insight’,
that is the mental power (bāla) of analysing enti-
ties and breaking them down into their more basic
elemental components—the dhammas that con-
stitutes the underlying, impermanent flow of
evanescent moments (kṣaṇa) which constitute our
experiences. In the Southern/Theravāda tradition,
Buddhaghosa explains that prajñā (pañña) is that
which penetrates the own nature of things
(dhamma-sabhava-pativedha, Visuddhimagga
XIV, 7). Paññā then is explicitly linked to the
cultivation of vipassanā, usually translated as
insight. This is seen as a profound realization of
the impermanent and dependently originated nat-
ure of entities. As Nanayakkara (1993: 580) notes
‘Insight is not knowledge in the general sense, but
penetrative knowledge acquired as a result of not
looking at but looking through things’.18
However, it is important to note that prajñā is
considered an occasional mental factor according
to the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition, whereas in the
Northern Abhidharma literature of the Sarvāsti-
vāda/Vaibhāṣika (and much of the subsequent
Mahāyāna literature which inherited and
responded to the Northern traditions), it is seen as
a universal factor present in all experience (if
developed to varying degrees).
With the emergence of Mahāyāna forms of
Buddhism in India from the ﬁrst century BCE,
we see a reaction to the Abhidharma approach
and its scholastic analysis of experience into
momentary events (dharmas). However, in the
Prajñāpāramitā literature this involves not a
repudiation of the Abhidharma emphasis upon
prajñā, but rather its intensiﬁcation. Prajñā
involves the analytic reduction of the conven-
tionally real entities of phenomenal experience
into their underlying (and for the Abhidharma,
ultimately real), dharmic components. The exer-
cise of the faculty of prajñā is crucial in an
Abhidharma context for establishing the distinc-
tion between ultimate (paramārtha) and con-
ventional (saṃvṛti) entities made by Vasubandhu
(1967) in Abhidharmakośa VI.4:
If the awareness of something does not operate after
that thing is physically broken up or separated by
the mind into other things, it exists conventionally
like a pot or water; others exist ultimately.19
Thus, the Prajñāpāramitā literature accepted
the Northern/Sarvāstivāda inclusion of prajñā as
a universal factor in experience and indeed pre-
supposed it as the basis for the universalization
of the ideal of the bodhisattva and the goal of
achieving full awakening for all sentient beings.
However, it criticized the Abhidharmic enterprise
for failing to take its own reductive analysis of
experience to its ﬁnal conclusion, that is a
recognition of the emptiness of dharmas them-
selves. Prajñā, or analytical insight, required
further intensiﬁcation (to be achieved by ‘prac-
tising the perfection of prajñā’). Within this
context, wisdom (jñāna) in its most advanced
forms came increasingly to be characterized as
non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) in nature.
Mahāyāna and the Emergence
of a Non-dualistic Understanding
of Mindfulness
Within those strands of what became Mahāyāna
Buddhism, we see the emergence of a more
avowedly non-dualistic conception of reality.
The dominant intellectual approaches in Indian
Mahāyāna, building upon the Prajñāpāramitā
worldview, emphasized the emptiness (śūnyatā)
of all dharmas. Although the precise nature of
this emptiness was conceived of slightly differ-
ently between early Mahāyāna schools such as
the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, they both
18Nayanakkara (1993). It is linked to a growing awareness
of the three marks of existence. 19Abhidharmakośa VI.4, translation by Buescher (1982).
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continued the radicalization of the
no-abiding-self teaching (anātman) and accorded
a central role to prajñā in Buddhist yogic prac-
tice. The non-dualistic spirit of these movements
however opened up the possibility of a greater
emphasis upon what Dunne (2013) calls the
‘innateist’ strand of Buddhist thought, that is an
approach to awakening which sees it as the
unveiling of a pure consciousness that already
exists in a veiled form within each sentient being.
Awakening (bodhi), on this model of con-
sciousness, involves the realization of that which
one already possesses, but which is hidden from
view by the karmic deﬁlements of consciousness.
Buddhist mental training on this model became
characterized as cleaning the mirror of con-
sciousness so that it could directly reflect things
as they are (yathābhūta). Indeed, as Olenzski
suggests (2013: 67), the Northern Abhidharma
tradition’s inclusion of prajñā as a universal
mental factor provided a theoretical rationale for
the innateist view (that the mind already contains
the factors pertaining to an already awakened
consciousness) to emerge. As suggested earlier,
this understanding of the Buddhist path is
asserted most strongly in the tathāgatagarbha
(‘Buddha nature’) literature that emerges from
around the third/fourth centuries CE and is fur-
ther consolidated by later Mahāyāna develop-
ments such as Tibetan notions of ‘other
emptiness’ (gzhan stong, propounded especially
but not exclusively by the Jo nan pas)20 and in
meditative practices such as dzogchen which
seek to uncover the pristine nature of
consciousness.
Dunne (2013: 75) has argued that the accounts
given of mindfulness practice in MBSR and
MBCT programmes seem more intellectually
akin to the non-dualistic innateist position than to
the constructivist position that generally prevails
in mainstream Abhidharma literature. Thus, he
suggests:
non-dual traditions, striking a stance deliberately
contrary to Abhidharma scholasticism, remain
highly sceptical about the utility of evaluative
thought in practice. Instead, one must become
released from the very structures of such thoughts,
since they are a manifestation of ignorance itself.21
Although the historical roots of the modern
‘mindfulness-only’ movement spring from late
colonial Burma and Theravāda reformism, as
Dunne suggests, the theoretical framework for
modernmindfulness discourse often bears a closer
resemblance to some forms of non-dualistic
Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna conceptions of medita-
tive practice. Jon Kabat-Zinn, for instance, sug-
gests that his own formulation of MBSR reflects
influences not only from the Theravāda vipassanā
movement but also from Korean Zen. In general
terms, however, influence may have less to do
with direct Mahāyāna influence than with the
diffusion of a broadly non-dualistic conception of
‘eastern spirituality’ that emerged ﬁrst with ﬁg-
ures like Swāmi Vivekānanda (1863–1902) and
then circulated more generally inWestern popular
culture throughout the twentieth century.
However, the curtailment of judgement and
ethical reflection are by no means absent in many
non-dualistic accounts because, as we shall see,
even within Buddhist trends with a strongly
non-dualistic philosophical orientation (such as in
the Zen-inspired Engaged Buddhism of Thich
Nhat Hanh and David Loy), the role of discern-
ment and a deep cognition of the underlying
causes of suffering remain central features of their
conception of engaged mindfulness practice. In
these accounts, the traditional emphasis upon the
importance of prajñā in the cultivation of mind-




In a number of his writings, Slavoj Zizek, a
doyen and enfant terrible of contemporary ‘crit-
ical theory’ circles but hardly any kind of expert
20For discussions of gzhan stong see Ruegg (1989);
Hookham (1991); Kapstein (2000); Smith (2001). Nhat
Hanh (1991), ‘tation and activity.ultural associations of
’ization of the ideal of the bodhisatvva—the ka and
Yoshe. 21Dunne (2013: 79).
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in the history of Buddhism, has argued that ‘New
Age Asiatic thought’ is ‘establishing itself as the
hegemonic ideology of global capitalism’. (Zizek
2001: 12). According to Zizek (2001: 13):
the “Western Buddhist” meditative stance is
arguably the most efﬁcient way, for us, to fully
participate in the capitalist dynamic while retaining
the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber
were alive today, he would deﬁnitely write a sec-
ond, supplementary volume to his Protestant
Ethic, entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of
Global Capitalism.
Zizek’s account however reflects a poor
understanding of the rigour and diversity of the
Buddhist traditions and practices that he so readily
dismisses and is part of a wider agenda in his work
in seeking to promulgate a ‘non-religious Chris-
tianity’ as the underlying cultural identity of the
West and defend it from foreign importations and
influences. Putting aside the considerable flaws in
Zizek’s polemical arguments for the moment,22
the question of distinguishing between the rich
diversity of Buddhist traditions in their historical
context and the ways in which they are being
deployed and represented in a modern ‘late capi-
talist’ context is an important issue to be addres-
sed in any attempt to understand modern
discourses of “mindfulness’, their roots and their
relationship to historical forms of Buddhism.
What Zizek rather casually refers to as ‘Western
Buddhism’ or ‘New Age Asiatic thought’ (and
which he often conflates with ‘Buddhism’ and
‘Taoism’ as a whole) is really an aspect of what I
have called elsewhere ‘capitalist spirituality’
(Carrette and King 2005). Indeed, it is the latest
manifestation in a long history of Western Ori-
entalist fantasies about ‘the mystic East’ (King
1999), generated and perpetuated by a continuous
flow of corporate advertising, marketing and
popular cultural images of ‘eastern spirituality’. It
is vital that we do not confuse these trends with
the rich and diverse Buddhist traditions that they
so actively misrepresent, not based upon some
traditional Orientalist appeal to the authority of
original forms, but rather to be able to understand
from the perspective of an informed history of
ideas, the sense in which modern discourses of
mindfulness carry forward and translate
long-established debates and tensions about the
nature of mental training (bhāvanā) in the Bud-
dhist tradition, and also ways in which they rep-
resent signiﬁcantly innovative developments in
response to the demands and context of
twenty-ﬁrst-century life.
Just as the early Buddhist movement in India
developed its conception of mind training in
response to prevailing attitudes and practices of its
day (what I am calling the ‘yogic philosophical
milieu’ of classical Indian thought), contemporary
discussions of ‘mindfulness’ are articulated in
relation to their own cultural/intellectual influ-
ences. In seeking to identify some of the key
cultural, social and political markers that are
reframing the discourse of mindfulness in the
early twenty-ﬁrst century, I wish to draw attention
to three factors: detraditionalization, capitalist
globalization and the impact of new digital tech-




Firstly, with regard to the process of the detra-
ditionalization of Buddhist ideas and practices,
the transformation of Asian religions into ‘east-
ern spiritualities’ in the late twentieth and early
twenty-ﬁrst centuries has of course also rendered
such established cultural traditions as more
readily exportable to the West, leading to the
development of what Heelas (1996) has called
the ‘self-spiritualities’ associated with the New
Age and to the commodiﬁcation and marketing
of yoga (for instance) as a physicalized therapy
and aid to ‘lifestyle enhancement’ in a late
twentieth-century context alongside the popular-
ity of MBSR practices. Zizek then is partly cor-
rect in that ‘Buddhism’ has indeed seen the
greatest market potential for ‘New Age Capital-
ists’ in the West.
As many scholars have noted, the spread of
modern ‘mindfulness-only’ practices is linked to
22For a critique of Zizek’s arguments in this regard see
Bowman (2007).
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the twentieth-century revival of Theravāda med-
itation in Southeast Asia and to the impact of
ﬁgures such as Burmese monk Mahāsī Sayādaw
(1904–1982) and his student and translator Nya-
naponika Thera (German-born Siegmund Feniger
1901–1994) in simplifying and codifying a form
of ‘insight-only’meditation accessible to the laity
(see for instance Braun 2013). The roots of the
modern mindfulness movement lie in the late
colonial and twentieth-century period, where
Western fascination with ‘the mystic East’ (King
1999) was consolidated and combined with
claims about the scientiﬁc and/or humanistic
nature of the Buddha and his teaching (Lopez
2009; McMahan 2008) to produce the conditions
for the emergence of the Mindfulness-Based
Stress Reduction (MBSR) program of Jon
Kabat-Zinn (1990) that has become so popular
today. This would have been impossible without
the earlier contribution of ﬁgures such as Swāmi
Vivekānanda (1863–1902) and D.T. Suzuki
(1870–1966)) who sought to distil the ‘universal’
message of ‘eastern spirituality’ from it’s specif-
ically Asian cultural and religious underpinnings,
thereby facilitating the migration and translation
of classical Buddhist discussions of mental
training into a modern psychologized discourse of
‘experience’ (Sharf 1995; King 1999; Carrette
and King 2005). This is not a value-neutral
decontextualization of Buddhist ideas, as is often
claimed, but rather their recontextualization in
terms of a new cultural, political and symbolic
order (Sharf 1995; King 1999).
Building upon the rise of Buddhist mod-
ernisms in the last century, concepts, ideas and
practices associated with Western conceptions of
‘Buddhism’ have become easily segregated from
their cultural, cosmological and institutional ori-
gins through homogenizing discourses about
‘eastern spirituality’ (Carrette and King 2005)
and MBSR practices that gain traction and pop-
ularity based upon the ancient and exotic cultural
capital of ‘Buddhism’, but have a low level of
engagement with Buddhist theories and prac-
tices. Moreover, since the dawn of European
romanticism and then again since the 1960s,
‘eastern philosophies’ have been associated in
the West with a kind of ‘countercultural’
exoticism that makes them hip, fashionable and
fresh for those seeking an alternative to mass
consumerism but also as an ‘alternative’ and
exotic ‘spirituality’ that offers an edge in the
competitive world of marketing and business
management. Thus, Kabat-Zinn is able to make a
double move whereby the cultural authority
provided by the ancient Buddhist origins of
‘mindfulness’ can be deployed to give social
capital and credibility to his techniques at the
same time as a rapid disavowal of the particu-
larity of those Buddhist roots are asserted
through a decontextualized universalization of
‘mindfulness’ as simply the practice of attention.
Mindfulness is actually a practice. It is a way of
being, rather than merely a good idea or a clever
technique or a passing fad. Indeed, it is thousands
of years old and is often spoken of as ‘the heart of
Buddhist meditation’, although its essence, being
about attention and awareness, is universal.23
However, to understand the explosion of
interest in mindfulness-related practices and
techniques in the contemporary period it is
inadequate to focus exclusively upon changing
modes of ‘religiosity’. One must also consider
what social, economic and political conditions
have encouraged this popularity. What changes
have precipitated the incredible demand for
mindfulness-related practices in the early
twenty-ﬁrst century that have captured the
attention of defenders and critics alike?
Digital Technologies, Distracted
Attention and the Problem
of ‘Information Overload’
A 2015 study (‘Attention Spans’), commissioned
by Microsoft Corp., recently suggested that
23Jon Kabat-Zinn, Foreword to Williams and Penman
(2011: 10). Indeed in an interview with the Los Angeles
Times in 2010, Kabat-Zinn goes even further, remarking
that ‘Mindfulness, the heart of Buddhist meditation, is at
the core of being able to live life as if it really matters. It
has nothing to do with Buddhism. It has to do with





widespread use of digital media technologies is
having a deleterious effect on sustained and
selective attention and contributing to a reorien-
tation of human consciousness where ‘alternating
attention’ (as in multitasking and switching
between devices) was becoming enhanced.
[What information consumes is] the attention of its
recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a
poverty of attention. (Herbert Simon 1978 Nobel
Prizewinner for Economics)
The fast-paced nature of contemporary digital
communications, the ‘information overload’ that
this creates, when combined with a neoliberal
conception of the individual as a high-functioning
‘entrepreneur of oneself’ (Rose 1996, 1999) has
arguably contributed to unprecedented levels of
stress and depression. This phenomenon—what
Jock Young (2007) has called the ‘vertigo of late
modernity’—has created a demand for techniques
to master and control attention. For this reason, a
critical analysis of the modern mindfulness
movement, from the point of view of the history of
ideas, must also examine the modern history of
distraction (Löffler 2014), its mediatized intensi-
ﬁcation in an age of fast-paced digital technolo-
gies, the levels of stress and anxiety produced by
continually dispersed attention in an age of per-
ceived economic and social precarity and the
requisite demand this has created for a variety of
relaxation techniques such as yoga and
mindfulness-related practices that seek to inten-
sify self-awareness and promote a non-distracted
sense of emotional integration, calmness and
well-being.
We are moving from a world where computing
power was scarce to a place where it now is almost
limitless, and where the true scarce commodity is
increasingly human attention.
(Satya Nadella, CEO of Microsoft)
In an era of digital ‘information overload’
delivered through multiple devices (multichannel
24-hour television, smart phones, computers,
tablets), the emphasis has shifted away from
advertising products to adverting the attention of
human beings towards those products. Thus, in a
data-saturated marketplace, capturing the atten-
tion of the potential consumer has now become
the emergent issue for corporate marketing
strategies looking to gain a competitive edge
over their opponents in the marketplace:
In post-industrial societies, attention has become a
more valuable currency than the kind you store in
bank accounts. The vast majority of products have
become cheaper and more abundant as the sum
total of human wealth increases. Venture capital
dollars have multiplied like breeding hamsters.
The problems for businesspeople lie on both sides
of the attention equation: how to get and hold the
attention of consumers, stockholders, potential
employees and the like, and how to parcel out their
own attention in the face of overwhelming options.
People and companies that do this succeed. The
rest fail. Understanding and managing attention is
now the single most important determinant of
business success. Welcome to the attention econ-
omy’ (my italics for emphasis).24
This new frontline in the global economy of
proliferated advertising has precipitated a
corporate-driven demand for techniques that seek
to capture, master and control attention. Simi-
larly, longer lifespan, population growth and the
spread of a neoliberal conception of the state as
increasingly withdrawn from providing public
services and social welfare have led to a wide-
spread privatization of health and social welfare
provision. This has generated a demand in
health-care systems worldwide for effective,
non-invasive and above all ‘cost-efﬁcient’ tech-
niques for enhancing patient health and
well-being. Thus, a critical understanding of the
emergence of the modern mindfulness movement
must consider not only the impact of consumer
capitalism and new digital technologies, but also
the modern history of mediatised distraction
(Löffler 2014) and the levels of stress and anxiety
engendered by changing lifestyles, occupational
patterns and new technologies (such as email)
that demand a state of continually dispersed
rather than sustained attention. This cognitive
‘switching’ demanded by these aspects of mod-
ern life has led to a growing demand for relax-
ation techniques such as yoga and ‘mindfulness’
that soothe a purposely displaced mind and seek
to intensify self-awareness and promote a
24Davenport and Beck (2001: 3).
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non-distracted sense of emotional integration,
calmness and well-being.
I wish to argue that this context is producing a
discursive split between two signiﬁcantly new
developments within what has been called
‘Buddhist modernism’ (see McMahan 2008) and
related secular proponents of ‘mindfulness’
practice. At the same time, as some see ‘Bud-
dhism’ as the perfect customizable ‘spirituality’
for the contemporary ‘entrepreneur of the self’ in
a neoliberal social context,25 Buddhist teachings
and traditions of practice also continue to res-
onate with those interested in developing coun-
tercultural resistance to ‘Western materialism’
and consumerism, especially within what has
become known as ‘Engaged Buddhism’.
The Contemporary Reworking
of an Ancient Debate: Does
Mindfulness Involve Mental Analysis
and Ethical Judgment?
The capitalist-oriented trend is exempliﬁed in the
business world by the proliferation of ‘spiritual
management’ courses exploring ‘Eastern’ philo-
sophical themes and meditative practices with the
aim of promoting workplace productivity,
short-term stress-relief for employees and proﬁt
generation, and also by various forms of ‘pros-
perity Buddhism’ such as the Dhammakaya
movement in contemporary Thailand. The
counter-consumerist trend manifests itself in
contemporary Thai movements such as the Santi
Asoke and in transnational trends such as the
various forms of ‘Engaged Buddhism’ which
seek to highlight social injustice and challenge
what is usually seen as corporate-driven con-
sumerism and materialism within contemporary
society. The distinction between these two Bud-
dhist strands is not always as clear cut as it might
seem, but much of their cultural authority in the
contemporary world resides in what they both
share in common, namely a reliance upon a
history of Orientalist assumptions and stereo-
types about Asian spirituality and philosophy
that have circulated the globe in the last couple of
centuries (King 1999; van der Veer 2013) and the
development of transnational forms of ‘Buddhist
modernism’ in the last century (Lopez 2009;
McMahan 2008).
As a number of scholars have noted, this
dominant popular trend, influenced by Mahāsi
Sayadaw and Nyanaponika Thera, generally
characterizes ‘mindfulness’ as a form of ‘bare
attention’—a witnessing of mental, emotional
and physical changes without any judgement or
disturbance by an inquiring or analytic mindset.
In the contemporary context, this has been rein-
forced by widespread popular cultural associa-
tions of ‘Zen’ in the West with ‘chilling out’ and
pacifying mental agitation and activity. The
second trend linked to the rise of an overtly
political wing of what has become known as
‘Engaged Buddhism’ sees mindfulness practice
as a form of consciousness-raising with regard to
social, political and economic injustice, driven
by a conceptualization of duḥkha as having
sociopolitical as well as individual dimensions.
As Nhat Hanh himself notes:
When I was in Vietnam, so many of our villages
were being bombed. Along with my monastic
brothers and sisters, I had to decide what to do.
Should we continue to practice in our monasteries,
or should we leave the meditation halls in order to
help the people who were suffering under the
bombs? After careful reflection, we decided to do
both – to go out and help people and to do so in
mindfulness. We called it engaged Buddhism,
Mindfulness must be engaged. One there is seeing,
there must be acting …. We must be aware of the
real problems of the world. Then, with mindful-
ness, we will know what to do and what not to do
to be of help.26
Nhat Hanh is quite explicit in noting that
attention to the causal conditions out of which our
everyday experiences emerge involves a mindful
awareness of their interdependent origination
(pratītyasamutpāda). This is pretty standard
fare from a traditional Abhidharmic point of view.
Of course, Nhat Hanh approaches mindfulness
25For a useful discussion of the rise of the ‘entrepreneur of
the self’ in neoliberal contexts see the works of Rose
(1996, 1999). 26Nhat Hanh (1991).
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practice from the point of view of Mahāyāna--
based Zen notions of emptiness (śūnyatā) and a
non-dualistic worldview. He extends this philos-
ophy through his notion of ‘interbeing’. Thus,
If you wish to have the insight of Interbeing you
only need to look at a basket of fresh green veg-
etables which you have just picked. Looking
deeply, you will see the sunshine, clouds, compost,
gardener and hundreds of thousands of elements
more. Vegetables cannot arise on their own, they
can only arise when there is sun, clouds, earth etc.
If you take the sun out of the basket of vegetables
the vegetables will no longer be there. If you take
the clouds away it is the same.27
Most of the time Nhat Hanh describes these
kinds of mindful moments in a way that reflects a
spirituality of ecological interdependence and
perhaps a recognition of the impact of our indi-
vidual patterns of consumption.28 Other advo-
cates of Engaged Buddhism such as David Loy,
Steven Batchelor29 and Phra Payutto30 are also
explicit about the crucial role that ethics and
ethical judgements play in mindfulness practice.
However, the recognition by engaged Buddhists
that duḥkha in fact is not merely an individual
experience of existential dissatisfaction, but are
also formed by instances of social suffering and
structural injustice, opens up the possibility that
to be truly mindful of the causal conditions that
produce, say, your experience of eating choco-
late, would necessitate an awareness of the
history of slavery and ongoing economic
exploitation of populations in relation to the
cocoa plantations out of which the chocolate was
produced and transported. This intellectual move,
it strikes me, takes mindfulness practice into a
new dimension that of facilitating a geopolitical
or global awareness of ‘interdependence’ and the
ways in which the lives of others impact upon
our most basic everyday experiences—especially
in facilitating a remembrance of history (smṛti,
traditionally translated) and a structural aware-
ness of the economic, political and ecological
dimensions of consumption.31
Meditation is to be aware of what is going on—in
our bodies, our feelings, our minds and the world.
Each day 40,000 children die of hunger. The for-
mer superpowers still have more than 50,000
nuclear warheads, enough to destroy the Earth
many times. Yes, the sunrise is beautiful, and the
rose that bloomed this morning along the wall is a
miracle. Life is both dreadful and wonderful. To
practice meditation is to be in touch with both
aspects.32
Note in the above quote howNhat Hanh begins
with the standard four objects of meditation as
outlined in the Mahā-saṭṭipathāna Sutta, viz. the
body, sensations, the mind and mental objects
(dhammas, here glossed as ‘the world’) and then
juxtaposes this to instances of mass-suffering and
military capacities for state-induced violence.
This is a clear extension of the range of ‘aware-
ness’ from individual experience to a sociopolit-
ical level and reflects an attempt to link individual
spiritual practice with a geopolitical conscious-
ness, a development that Raphäel Liogier has
27Nhat Hanh (2004), (see webpage: http://www.
purifymind.com/ManNotEnemy.htm).
28See for instance, Nhat Hanh (2009).
29Steven Batchelor asserts that ‘Ethics as practice beings
by including ethical dilemmas in the sphere of meditative
awareness- to be mindful of the conflicting impulses that
invade consciousness during meditation. Instead of dis-
missing these as distractions (which would be quite
legitimate when cultivating concentration), one recog-
nizes them as potentials for actions that may result in
one’s own or others’ suffering.’ (my italics for emphasis).
See Batchelor (1993).
30Payutto, for instance asserts that ‘Buddhadhamma
emphasizes the importance of sati at every level of
ethical conduct. Mindfully conducting your life and your
practice of the Dhamma is called appamāda, or consci-
entiousness [ and is ] of central importance to progress in
the Buddhist system of ethics’. Reciprocally, ‘ proper
ethics have value because they because they nurture and
improve the quality of the mind’. Payutto (1995).
31The best example I have found of this in Nhat Hanh’s
writings are his reflections on his poem ‘Please Call Me
By My True Names’ where Nhat Hanh makes explicit the
link between the individual and the political: ‘Do our
daily lives have nothing to do with our government?
Please meditate on this … When we pick up a Sunday
newspaper, we should know that in order to print that
edition, which sometimes weights 10 or 12 lb, they had to
cut down a whole forest. We are destroying our Earth
without knowing it. Drinking a cup of tea, picking up a
newspaper, using toilet paper, all of these thing to do with
peace. Nonviolence can be called ‘awareness’We must be
aware of what we are, of who we are, and of what we are
doing.’ See Nhat Hanh (1988: 31–39).
32Nhat Hanh (1987).
3 ‘Paying Attention’ in a Digital Economy: Reflections … 41
r.e.king@kent.ac.uk
described as the ‘individuo-globalist ideology’ of
such engaged forms of Buddhism.33 From this
kind of vantage point, mindfulness practice
explicitly involves not only the exercise of ethical
judgements and analysis of underlying causal
processes but also the fostering of a ‘deep’ cog-
nition of the geopolitical dimensions of individual
experiences. Thus, Sulak Sivaraksa makes the
claim that:
On a political level, mindfulness can help in our
work against consumerism, sexism, militarism,
and the many other isms that undermine the
integrity of life. It can be a tool to help us criticize
positively and creatively our societies, nations and
even cultural and religious traditions. Rather than
hate our oppressors, we can dismantle oppressive
systems. Is the international economic system that
demands unlimited growth inherently defective?
From a Buddhist perspective, the answer is yes.34
By contrast, as we have seen, building upon
Nyanaponika Thera’s focus upon ‘bare attention’,
contemporary secular accounts of mindfulness
practice tend to focus upon an attitude of passive
acceptance and a suspension of critical reflection
when practising mindfulness.35 Thus, Mark Wil-
liams, Emeritus Professor of Clinical Psychiatry
and former Director of the Oxford Mindfulness
Centre at Oxford University and Danny Penman,
a meditation teacher and journalist, in outlining
the signiﬁcance of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive
Therapy (MBCT), make the claim that ‘Mind-
fulness is about observation without criticism;
being compassionate with yourself.’36
Conclusion
Both the MBSR/MBCT and Engaged Buddhist
developments resonate with ancient strands within
earlier Buddhist discussions of mental training
(bhāvanā).The ﬁrst, in the emphasis placed upon a
suspension of ratiocination, is arguably more clo-
sely associated with the path of concentration
(śamatha-yāna) and the quiescence of cognition,
but has a long history in Buddhist literature, rein-
forced by the emergence of non-dualistic inter-
pretations of the Buddha’s message which in some
instances see the goal of mental training as the
cultivation of a form of non-conceptual awareness
(nirvikalpa jñāna) grounded in the cultivation of
equanimity (upekṣā). It is perhaps ironic that the
modern practice of ‘mindfulness-only’ is generally
characterized by an abandonment of the
long-standing emphasis upon the cultivation of
‘concentration’ techniques designed to stabilize
and quieten the mind, when the characterization
often provided of what such mindfulness practice
entails bears more of a resemblance to the estab-
lishment of mental quiescence rather than
achieving greater cognitive acuity. One explana-
tion for this is that what is being discussed in many
accounts of ‘suspending judgement’ during
mindfulness practice corresponds to what would
have been seen in a traditional Buddhist context as
a fairly preliminary act of mental cleansing
required for beginners (what Nyanaponika calls
‘tidying up the mental household’)37 rather than
the cultivation of a highly rareﬁed and
concept-free state of awareness as in the advanced
samādhis. As Dreyfus (2013: 52) notes:
By over-emphasizing the non-judgemental nature
of mindfulness and arguing that our problems stem
from conceptuality, contemporary authors are in
danger of leading to a one-sided understanding of
mindfulness as a form of therapeutically helpful
spacious quietness.
The second trend in modern accounts of
mindfulness builds upon the emphasis in many
Buddhist texts on the role of paññā/prajñā—an-
alytical insight—as a deconstructive analysis of
entities into the evanescent dharmas that are said
to constitute the underlying complexity thatmakes
up our experiences. This second approach places
great emphasis on the role of judgement and dis-
cernment in ‘witnessing’ one’s experiences,
mental reflection upon the underlying causes of
their emergence and an ethical consciousness to
33Liogier (2004).
34Sivaraksa (2011: 83).
35For an insightful discussion of Nyanaponika’s focus on
‘bare attention’ as a characterisation of sati see the
discussion in Bodhi (2013: 27f).
36Williams and Penman (2011: 5). 37Thera (1968: 1).
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direct the mind gently towards ever more whole-
some mental states (Sanskrit: kuśalā dharmā). In
this second formulation of mindfulness, therefore,
discernment, analysis and ethical judgement are
part and parcel of the awakening experience.What
is innovative however about the way this is being
developed within some Engaged Buddhist litera-
ture and movements is the consideration of the
geopolitical and economic dimensions of the
causal nexus of the individual human experience.
What we have then is an Engaged Buddhist
reformulation of traditional discussions about sati
in a way that reframes mindfulness as a geopolit-
ical or planetary awareness of one’s ‘interbeing’
(Thich Nhat Hanh) and the social, political and
economic injustices that operate in the causal
nexus of even our most everyday, subjective
experiences. In this way, what we see emerging
here is a Buddhist project for an ethical decolo-
nization of consciousness in response to a per-
ceived sense of growing global inequalities in an
age characterized by neoliberal ideologies and
capital-driven globalization. This, despite the
claims of many Engaged Buddhists, is demon-
strably new and an innovation in Buddhist dis-
courses about mindfulness, as is the emphasis
upon ‘mindfulness-only’ practices in general.
Our discussion has focused on two divergent
trends in contemporary discourses of mindfulness.
One trend, following Mahāsī Sayādaw and Nya-
naponika Thera, represents ‘mindfulness’ as a
form of ‘bare attention’—a largely paciﬁed ‘wit-
ness consciousness’ devoid of judgement or dis-
turbance by an inquiring or analytic mindset (see
Sharf 2014a; Dreyfus 2013) and is the dominant,
popular characterization of mindfulness in the
secular, scientiﬁc, military and business worlds. In
contrast, the second trend, linked to what has
become known as ‘Engaged Buddhism’, empha-
sizes an extensive role for ethical reflection and
mental cognition, arguing that mindfulness
denotes an awareness of our radical interbeing (as
in Thich Nhat Hanh’s (re-) formulation of the
Buddhist teaching of pratītyasamutpada) and
even a recognition of the geopolitical dimensions
of individual experiences (such as awareness of
the history of colonial exploitation and economic
inequality of cocoa plantations as causal factors in
one’s experience of eating chocolate). Both
interpretations build upon ancient strands: the ﬁrst
in the emphasis placed upon an abandonment of
ratiocination and the quiescence of cognition
(Grifﬁths 1986; Sharf 2014b) and the second by
resonating with the emphasis in many Buddhist
texts on the role of paññā/prajñā—analytical
insight (i.e. a deconstructive analysis of entities
into the evanescent dharmas that constitute our
experiences) and an ethical concern to direct the
mind towards wholesome mental states (Sanskrit:
kuśalā dharmā). Between these two characteri-
zations, there are of course amultitude of practices
and emphases and it is not my intention to suggest
that all practices seeking to promote mindfulness
meditation fall easily into either of these camps.
The different characterizations of mindfulness
practices over the question of mental reflection
and ethical judgement have ancient roots but are
today reflective of the struggle to represent the
implications and importance of modern mindful-
ness practices in an age of economic and social
anxiety about the impact of consumerism and
rapid neoliberal globalization. Together, these two
ends of the spectrum embody two sides of an
emerging fault line about the meaning and sig-
niﬁcance of mindfulness practice in the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
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